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THE FINES IMPOSED IN EEC COMPETITION
CASES IN LIGHT OF THE PIONEER HI-FI
DECISION
VIRGINIA MORRIS*
The EEC Commission' has announced a new policy2 of imposing higher fines for clear, serious infringements of the competition rules provided in Articles 85-86 of the EEC Treaty.3 This
policy was first demonstrated in the Pioneer Hi-Fi case,4 in which
the Commission imposed fines totalling nearly seven million EEC
units of account (approximately 10 million U.S. dollars) on the four
participants who were found to have engaged in export bans in violation of Article 85. The undertakings, which are part of the European distribution system for Pioneer products, participated in
concerted practices to prevent parallel imports from Germany and
the United Kingdom from entering France for the purpose of
maintaining higher prices in France. The Court of Justice5 lowered
the fines to 3.2 million EEC units of account (approximately 2.5
million U.S. dollars) due to a reduction in the duration of the infringement. Notably, the Court affirmed the Commission's author* B.A., 1978, magna cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa, San Diego State University; J.D.,
1982, McGeorge School of Law; 1984, The Hague Academy of International Law. The author was an intern with the Legal Service of the EEC Commission, and would like to thank
John Temple Lang for the opportunity of working with him on the Pioneer Hi-Fi case and
for his very helpful comments on this article. Ms. Morris is presently a consultant for the
Union of Intemational Ass o#aions at the Unted Nations Headquarters in Geneva.
1. Hereinafter referred to as "the Commission."
2. EEC Commission's Ninth Report on Competition Policy, April 1980, at point 99.
3. Article 85 prohibits "all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations
of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and
which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
within the common market .... " Article 85 provides examples of restrictive agreements.
Article 86 is designed to prevent "Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant
position within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member
States." Article 86 provides examples of conduct which may constitute an unlawful abuse.
4. Pioneer Hi-Fi, [1980] O.J. L60/21, [19801 1 COMM. MKT. L.R. 457 (see Appendix).
(In compliance with the author's request, the JOURNAL will cite both Common Market cases
and European Community publications according to European citation form for this article
only.)
5. The Court of Justice of the European Communities [hereinafter referred to as "the
Court"].
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ity to impose higher fines in furtherance of the Community's
competition policies, and offered some clear guidelines with regard
to the fines imposed in competition cases.6
There is every reason to believe that the Commission will continue to impose higher fines in appropriate cases.7 In his opinion in
the Pioneercase, Advocate General Slynn noted the importance the
Commission places on its new fining policy:
The commission maintains that 'the real issue in this case' is the
amount of the fines. This was the first case in which the Commission imposed fines of 3-4% of the turnover of the undertakings in question. In the past, the fines had been within the range
of 1-2%, in similar cases. The Commission explained at the
hearing that it is now applying a new policy in respect of fines.
That policy, which entails higher fines, has been applied, it is

said, by the Commission, though not accepted by the applicants,
in all cases subsequent to the present one. For this reason, the
test case for the competiCommission regards this as a 'crucial
8
tion policy of the community.'
In light of the substantial fines which may be expected in the future,
it is important to understand the criteria the Commission uses in
deciding to impose a fine and in establishing the appropriate
amount.
I.

THE COMMISSION'S POWER TO IMPOSE FINES

The Commission may impose a fine on an undertaking or an
association of undertakings for an intentional or a negligent infringement of the competition rules pursuant to Article 15(2) of
Regulation 17.' The Regulation provides for fines in the amount of
6. Musique Diffusion Francaise SA and Others v. Commission ('Pioneer') (Cases 100103/80) [1983] 3 COMM. MKT. L.R. 221 (see Appendix). There are five Advocates General
who assist the members of the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg. An Advocate
General's opinion contains an analysis of the legal and factual issues presented in the case to
assist the Court in reaching its decision. See C. KERSE, EEC ANTITRUST PROCEDURE 29

(1981).
7. See Lang, Compliance with the Common Market'sAntitrust Law, 14 INT'L LAW 485,
488 (1980).
8. Pioneer, supranote 6. In the published version of a Commission decision imposing
a fine, the turnover figures and percentages are usually deleted pursuant to Article 21 of
Regulation 17, which provides for the non-disclosure of business secrets. Article 21, Regulation 17, J.0. 210/62; O.J. (Special Edition 1959-62), at 57.
9. Article 15(2) of Regulation 17, supra note 8, at 57. This paper will discuss the fines
imposed for substantive violations of Articles 85-86. An undertaking may be subject to a fine
for the breach of an obligation imposed pursuant to an 85(3) exemption. The Commission
has not yet exercised its power to impose such fines. This paper will not discuss the procedural fines imposed for the failure to supply correct information or the periodic penalties
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one thousand to one million EEC units of account, or a sum in
excess thereof, but not exceeding ten percent of the turnover of the
participating undertaking for the preceding business year. It is expressly stated that these fines are not criminal in nature.' ° The
Commission is not authorized to imprison or to impose fines on the
directors, the officers, or the employees who act on behalf of the
undertaking." However, an individual who engages in independent economic activity may2 be treated as an undertaking for the purpose of imposing a fine.'
Fines are imposed on the undertaking or the association of undertakings which are responsible for the unlawful behavior. This
requires action by a person who was authorized to act on behalf of
the undertaking or its legal predecessor.' 3 In the Pioneercase, the
Court rejected the argument that the infringement was not attributable to one of the undertakings, as the partners had neither intentionally nor negligently committed the infringement. The Court
imposed to coerce compliance which are also provided for in Articles 15(1) and 16 of Regulation 17.
10. However, the fines provided for in Regulation 17, which are often referred to as
administrative fines, are not in practice substantially different from criminal sanctions, given
the purpose and the amount of the fines. In the Quinine case, the Court stated that the
purpose of the fines imposed in competition cases is to "suppress illegal activities and to
prevent any recurrence." Boehringer Mannheim GmbH v. Commission (Case 45/69) [1970]
E.C.R. 769, COMM. MKT. L.R. 8085, at point 53.
11. In the United States, the directors and the officers of a company may be subject to a
fine or imprisonment for a violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. 1.
12. In the following cases the Commission has indicated that an individual may be
treated as an undertaking within the context of Article 85: AOIP/Bayrard, [1979] O.J. L6/8,
[1976] 1 COMM. MKT. L.R. D 14 (patent licensor); Vaessen/Moris, [1979] O.J. L19/32, [1979]
i COMM. MKT. L.R. 511 (patent licensor); Reuter/BASF, [i976] OJ. L254/40, [i976] 2
COMM. MKT. L.R. D44 (controlling shareholder of a group of companies exploited the results of his research and acted as a commercial adviser to third parties); RAI/UNITEL,
[1978] O.J. L157/39, [1978] 3 COMM. MKT. L.R. 306 (artists commercially exploited their
artistic performances). No fines for substantive violations were imposed in any of these
cases. The decision in the RAI/UNITEL case provided for procedural fines and periodic
penalties in the event of a failure to supply complete and accurate information. The Commission should also have the power to impose on an undertaking in the form of an individual
the higher fines provided for substantive violations, if the requirements of Regulation 17 are
met and the circumstances of the case justify the imposition of a fine. In establishing the
amount of the fine it would be appropriate to consider the "size" or the financial position of
the individual with regard to the commercial activities in question.
13. Examples of cases in which an undertaking was held responsible for the unlawful
conduct of its legal predecessor include: Floral, [1980] O.J. L39/51, [1980] 2 COMM. MKT.
L.R. 285 (see Appendix); SA Gnrale Sucriere and Societ Beghin-Say v. Commission
(Cases 41,43 and 44/73) (interpretation) [1977] E.C.R. 445; Co-operative Vereniging Suiker
Unie' and Others v. Commission (Cases 40-48, 50, 54-56, 111, 113 and 114/73) [1975] E.C.R.
1663, [1976] 1 COMM. MKT. L.R. 295, at points 75-88 (see Appendix); and Quinine, [1967]
J.O. L192/5, [1969] COMM. MKT. L.R. D41.
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stated that "it is not necessary for there to have been action by, or
even knowledge on the part of, the partners or principal managers
of the undertaking concerned; action by a person
who is authorized
14
to act on behalf of the undertaking suffices."'
A company which participates in an infringement cannot
avoid responsibility by arguing that its representatives acted without authority. In the IPTC Belgium" case, the Commission decided that the company had participated in the NAVEWAANSEAU technical standards agreement, which was used to restrict parallel imports. IPTC's responsibility for the infringement
was based on its membership in the CEG organization, and on its
participation in drawing up and implementing the agreement. The
Commission held that IPTC was not exonerated from responsibility
for the infringement because its representatives at various meetings
were not authorized to commit the company to the agreement. The
Commission found that in fact the representatives had committed
the company to the agreement, the company had been given an
opportunity to amend the agreement before its final adoption, and
16
the agreement had been implemented by the company.
A fine may be imposed on a parent company for an infringement committed by its subsidiary. The unlawful behavior of the
subsidiary may be imputed to the parent company if the parent
controlled the subsidiary,' 7 or if the parent and the subsidiary operated as a single economic unit.' 8 In the recent AEG-Telefunken
case,' 9 the Commission for the first time imposed a fine for the restrictive application of a distribution system, even though the Commission had not initially challenged the distribution agreement. In
holding the parent company (AEG-Telefunken) responsible for the
unlawful conduct of its subsidiaries, the Commission concluded
that "the distribution agreement was applied in the interests of
14. Pioneer, supra note 6, at point 97.
15. IPTC Belgium, 11983] O.J. L376/77.
16. Id. at points 17-18. See also NAVEWA-ANSEAU, [1982] O.J. L167/39, [1982] 2
COMM. MKT. L.R. 193, as amended [19821 O.J. L325/20, [1983] 1 COMM. MKT. L.R. 470.
17. ICI and Others v. Commission (Cases 48, 49, 51-57/69) [1972] E.C.R. 619, [1972]
COMM. MKT. L.R. 557 (see Appendix); Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can
Company Inc. v. Commission (Case 6/72) [1973] E.C.R. 215, [1973] COMM. MKT. L.R. 199.
18. Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and Commercial Solvents Corporation v.
Commission (Cases 6 and 7/73) [1974] E.C.R. 223, [1974] 1 COMM. MKT. L.R. 309; United
Brands v. Commission (Case 27/76) [1978] E.C.R. 207, [19781 1 COMM. MKT. L.R. 429 (see
Appendix); Hoffman-La Roche & Co. AG v. Commission (Case 85/76) [1979] E.C.R. 461,
[1979] 3 COMM. MKT. L.R. 211.
19. AEG-Telefunken, [1982] O.J. L117/15, [1982] 2 COMM. MKT. L.R. 386 (see
Appendix).
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AEG which, in the final analysis, was itself responsible for introducing and implementing it."2 0
In another recent case, Moet et Chandon (London) Ltd.,2 ' the
Commission imposed a fine on the French parent company, MoetHennessy, for the export bans contained in the contracts of its
wholly-owned English subsidiary, Moet et Chandon (London) Ltd.,
in violation of Article 85. The Commission found that the parent
company "must have been and in fact was aware of the substance
of the terms of sale at issue since they made it responsible for handling export orders. '2 2 A parent company located outside of the
EEC may be held responsible for the anti-competitive conduct of
its subsidiary within the EEC if the necessary element of control or
23
economic unity is present.
The Commission may impose a single fine for which the parent company and its affiliates are jointly and severally responsible.
Joint and several liability facilitates the enforcement of a fine, as it
allows the Commission to collect the entire amount from an undertaking either located within the EEC, or in a financial position to
pay the fine. The Commission has in fact imposed this type of liability only in cases which involved a parent company located
outside of the EEC.24 In the Commercial Solvents case, 25 the Commission held the American parent company and its fifty-one percent Italian subsidiary jointly and severally liable for the fine
imposed. Liability was based on a refusal to supply in which both
companies had participated in violation of Article 86.26 In the
20. Id.at point 74.
21.

MoetetChandon (London) Ltd., [19821] 0..

L94/17, [1982] 2 COMM

.L.

161

(see Appendix).
22. Id. at point 20.
23. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18. See also Johnson & Johnson, [19801 O.J.
L377/16, [1981] 2 COMM. MKT. L.R. (see Appendix); The EEC Commission's Sixth Report
on Competition Policy, April 1977, points 37-39.
24. The Commission imposed joint and several liability for the fine in the Commercial
Solvents case (American parent and 51% Italian subsidiary engaged in unlawful refusal to
supply under Article 86), the Hugin/Liptons case (Swedish parent and English subsidiary
participated in a refusal to supply in violation of Article 86), and the Johnson & Johnson
case (American parent and English, German, and Swiss subsidiaries violated Article 85 by
including export bans in the subsidiaries' contracts). The Hugin/Liptons decision was annulled by the Court for other reasons. Hugin/Liptons, [1978] O.J. L22/23, [1978] 1 COMM.
MKT. L.R. D19; Hugin Kassaregister AB v. Commission (Case 22/78) [1979] E.C.R. 1869,
[1979] 3 COMM. MKT. L.R. 345 (see Appendix); Johnson & Johnson, supra note 23.
25. Commercial Solvents/Zoja, [1972] J.O. L299/51, [1973] COMM. MKT. L.R. D50 (see
Appendix).
26. The Court did not expressly rule on the propriety of imposing joint and several
liability for the fine. The Court noted that both the parent and the subsidiary participated in
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Johnson & Johnson case, decided by the Commission in 1980, the
American parent company and its three European subsidiaries
were held jointly and severally accountable for the fine imposed as
a result of the "various measures to prevent parallel exports [which]
were taken in their common interest, under the control and with the
knowledge of the parent company. "27
According to the Commission's decision in the Johnson &
Johnson case, the amount of the fine is not affected by the fact that
a single fine is imposed jointly and severally on the affiliated companies. 28 However, in determining the appropriate fine for the purpose of preventing recurrence, the Commission considered the size
of the Johnson & Johnson group. Additionally, if a fine in excess of
1,000,000 units of account is imposed on a group of affiliated companies which are being treated as a single economic unit, the ten
percent limit would be applied to the total turnover of the group.2 9
If the Commission imposed joint and several liability on companies
which were not part of the same economic group, then the maximum fine could not exceed ten percent of the turnover of any one
of the participants.30
The Commission may impose a fine on a non-Community undertaking for an act committed within the EEC, either directly or
through a subsidiary, or for an act committed outside of the EEC
which has an effect on competition within the Community.3 The
Commission has referred to the effects doctrine in several of its
cases.3 2 A fine imposed against a non-Community undertaking,
the infringement and in fact operated as a single economic unit. The fine was reduced for
other reasons. Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and Commercial Solvents Corp. v.
Commission (Cases 6 and 7/73) [1974] E.C.R. 223, [1974] 1 COMM. MKT. L.R. 309, at point
41.
27. Johnson & Johnson, supra note 23, at point 47.
28. Id.at points 48-50.
29. The Commission considered the Johnson & Johnson group as a single undertaking
for purposes of the ten percent maximum. "The companies involved sell many products, and
the maximum fine which could be imposed under Regulation No. 17 would be 10% of total
turnover in all products." Id.at point 50.
30. See KERSE, supra note 6, at 188-89 (1981).
3 1. In the Vegetable Parchment case a fine was imposed on a Finnish manufacturer for
fixing price increases in relation to goods sold in the Common Market. Vegetable Parchment, [1978] O.J. L70/54, [1978] 1 COMM. MKT. L.R. 534 (see Appendix).
32. See Dyestuffs, [1969] J.O. L195/11, [1969] COMM. MKT. L.R. D23; Vitamins, [1976]
O.J. L223/27, [1976] 2 COMM. MKT. L.R. D25 (see Appendix); and Franco-Japanese
Ballbearings Agreement, [1974] O.J. L343/19, [1975] 1 COMM. MKT. L.R. D8. Advocate
General Mayras in the Dyestuffs case and Advocate General Warner in the Commercial
Solvents case accept the applicability of the effects doctrine in competition cases. The Court
referred to the doctrine in the Bguelin case, although the issue was not before the Court. In
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which does not have an affiliated company in the EEC, may be

enforced against any property which the foreign company may
have within the EEC, such as goods or receipts in an EEC bank
account.
II.

INTENTIONAL OR NEGLIGENT INFRINGEMENT

Fines may be imposed in the same case for intentional or negligent infringements of the competition rules.3 3 The Commission
has in some cases made an alternative finding that the infringement
was either committed intentionally or negligently.3 4 If the alternative finding is due to insufficient evidence of an intentional infringement, then any fine imposed should be in proportion to a
negligent infringement.35 However, in practical terms, the result
the Dyestuffs, Continental Can, and the Commercial Solvents cases the Court preferred to
impute the conduct of the EEC subsidiary to the foreign parent. Bdguelin Import Co. v. G.L.
Import-Export SA (Case 22/71) [19711 E.C.R. 949, [1972] COMM. MKT. L.R. 81; Istituto
Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and Commerical Solvents Corp. v. Commission (Cases 6 and
7/73R) [19731 E.C.R. 357, [1973] COMM. MKT. L.R. 361; (Cases 6 and 7/73) [1974] E.C.R.
223, [19741 1 COMM. MKT. L.R. 309; Europemballage Corp. and Continental Can Co. Inc. v.
Commission (Case 6/72) [1973] E.C.R. 215, [1973] COMM. MKT. L.R. 199; ICI Ltd. v. Commission (Case 48/69) [1972] E.C.R. 619, [1972] COMM. MKT. L.R. 557.
33. Article 15 of Regulation 17, supra note 8.
34. Harding recommends the use of an alternative finding as to the nature of the infringement. Harding, The Use of Finesas a Sanction in EEC Competition Law, 16 COMM.
MKT. L. REV. 591, 603 (1979). Kerse questions this alternative approach with regard to the
Court's review of the alternative finding and the amount of the fine. KERSE, supranote 6, at
168-69. In the General Motors case Advocate General Mayras stated that in his opinion the
Court would have to annul a decision which contained a finding of an intentional or a negligent infringement if the Court found that the infringement was merely one of negligence. In
the BMW case Advocate General Warner took the position that the Court could exercise its
broad powers of review in such a case and lower the fine if necessary. The Court has not
expressed disapproval of the Commission's use of an alternative finding as to the intentional
or negligent nature of the infringement. See the opinion of Advocate General Mayras in
General Motors Continental NV v. Commission (Case 26/75) [1975] E.C.R. 1367, [1976] 1
COMM. MKT. L.R. 95 (see Appendix), and the opinion of Advocate General Warner in
BMW Belgium SA and Others v. Commission (Cases 32/78 and 36-82/78) [1979] E.C.R.
2435, [1980] 1 COMM. MKT. L.R. 370 (see Appendix). See also Pittsburgh Coming, [1972]
J.O. L272/35, [1973] COMM. MKT. L.R. D2 (intentionally or negligently) (see Appendix);
Sugar, [1973] O.J. L140/17, [1973] COMM. MKT. L.R. D65 (deliberately, or at least through
negligence) (see Appendix); Vitamins, [1976] O.J. L223/27, [1976] 2 COMM. MKT. L.R. D25
(intentionally, or at least through negligence).
35. The principle of proportionality requires the fine to be in proportion to the size of
the participant and the nature of the unlawful conduct. The principle is discussed in relation
to the fines imposed in Community competition cases in United Brands Co. and United
Brands Continental BV v. Commission (Case 27/76) [1978] E.C.R. 207, [1978] 1 COMM.
MKT. L.R. 429, at point 302; BMW Belgium SA and Others v. Commission, supranote 34, at
point 47; and Pioneer, supranote 6, at points 199-122. The Commission expressly recognized
this principle in Johnson & Johnson, supra note 23. See also KERSE, supra note 6.
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may not be substantially different because the facts that tend to
show intentional conduct may be considered in determining the
gravity of the infringement, which in turn affects the amount of the
fine. In recent cases, the Commission has not hesitated to find that
an intentional infringement has been committed, and to impose a
fine commensurate with this finding when the facts and circumstances of the case have supported such a decision.3 6
To find an intentional infringement the undertaking must act
for the purpose of achieving some objective which is inconsistent
with Articles 85-86. In several cases the undertakings were found
to have committed intentional infringements because they acted
with an awareness either of the unlawful nature of the conduct or
its anti-competitive effect. In NAVEWA-ANSEA U, the undertakings which participated in creating the contractual system of checking conformity with technical requirements, which in effect
operated as a prohibition on parallel imports, "committed these infringements deliberately, because they were aware of the anti-competitive object of the Agreement. ' ' 37 There are now certain
infringements, such as export bans, which are so well established in
Community law that an undertaking cannot be unaware of their
unlawful nature. Thus an undertaking which commits one of these
infringements would be held to have done so intentionally. In the
Moet et Chandon case, the Commission, in concluding that the undertakings had intentionally infringed Article 85, stated that they
"must have known that export bans constitute a serious infringement of the competition rules." 38 It is not necessary to show that
the participant knew it was acting in violation of Articles 85-86, 3 9
though such knowledge would certainly indicate an intentional infringement.' Efforts to conceal an agreement or a practice would
also provide strong evidence of an intentional violation.4 '
36. See Moet et Chandon (London) Ltd., supra note 21; Kawasaki, [1979] O.J. L16/9,
[1979] 1 COMM. MKT. L.R. 448 (see Appendix); Hasselblad, [1982] O.J. L161/18, [19821 2
COMM. MKT. L.R. 233 (see Appendix).
37. NAVEWA-ANSEAU, supra note 16, at point 72 (see Appendix).
38. Moet et Chandon (London) Ltd., supra note 21, at point 20.
39. BMW Belgium SA and Others v. Commission, supra note 34, at point 44; Miller
International Schallplatten v. Commission (Case 19/77) [19781 E.C.R. 131, [19781 2 COMM.
MKT. L.R. 334, at point 18 (see Appendix); and Johnson & Johnson, supra note 23.
40. In WEA-Fillipacchi, 11972] J.O. L303/52, [1973] COMM. MKT. L.R. D43, the French
distributor intentionally infringed upon Article 85 by seeking to enforce an export ban after
being informed by dealers that the prohibition was inconsistent with Article 85 (see
Appendix).
41. Quinine, [1967] J.O. L192/5, [1969] COMM. MKT. L.R. D41.
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The necessary intent to support a finding of an intentional violation may be inferred from the deliberate, anti-competitive nature
of the participant's conduct. In Hoffman-La Roche & Co. AG v.
Commission,4 2 the Court found that the requirements contracts and
fidelity rebates were an intentional infringement of Article 86 based
on the nature of the conduct involved. The Court concluded:
The suggestions and instructions contained in Management Information and the other internal documents relating to the importance and the anticipated effects of entering into contracts,
which provide for the purchaser obtaining his requirements exclusively from Roche and for a system of fidelity rebates, in relation to the retention by Roche of its market shares prove that the
applicant intentionally pursued a commercial policy designed to
bar the access to the market of new competitors. The increase
from 1970 onwards of contracts under which the purchaser obtains his supplies exclusively from Roche or is induced to so confirms this intention.43
The competition rules may be violated as a result of negligence
if the undertaking knew or should have known that the conduct in
question was unlawful, or was likely to result in a restriction on
competition." In the Deutsche Philps case,4 5 the undertaking was
found to have negligently violated Article 85 when it failed to remove one of several export bans relating to various products as the
result of an error, after having removed the other ones in response
to an earlier Commission proceeding. The undertaking was negligent in its failure to remove all of the unlawful clauses or to inform
the parties concerned that exports in general were no longer
prohibited.
In the United Brandscase, the Court indicated that the size and
experience of the undertaking should be taken into consideration in
determining the question of negligence. The Court commented:
UBC is an undertaking which, having engaged for a very long
time in international and national trade has special knowledge of
anti-trust laws and has already experienced their severity. UBC,
by setting up a commercial system combining the prohibition of
the sale of bananas while still green, discriminatory prices, deliv42. Hoffman-La Roche & Co. AG v. Commission (Case 85/76) [19791 E.C.R. 461,
[1979] 3 COMM. MKT. L.R. 211.
43. Id. at point 139.
44. United Brands Co. and United Brands Continental BV v. Commission (Case 27/76)
[1978] E.C.R. 207, [1978] 1 COMM. MKT. L.R. 429.
45. Deutsche Philips, [1973] J.O. L293/40, [1973] COMM. MKT. L.R. D241 (see
Appendix).

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,

9

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 14, No. 3 [], Art. 3
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL

LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 14

eries less than the amounts ordered, all of which was to end in
strict partitioning of national markets, adopted measures which
it knew or ought to have known contravened the prohibition set
out in Article 86 of the Treaty.46
It is now clear that undertakings operating in the EEC are expected to be familiar with Community competition law.47 In the
Johnson & Johnson case, the Commission indicated that the United
States parent company "knew or should have known that it and its
affiliates have to comply with the law of the European Communities."'48 In the Hoffman-La Roche case, the Court stated that it was
proper for the Commission to consider the case law concerning Article 86, related provisions of the EEC Treaty, and actions taken by
the national authorities concerning anti-competitive practices, in
determining whether or not the Commission's decision to apply Article 86 to the requirements contracts and fidelity rebates was based
on any factor which was "impossible to foresee or which gave rise
to unreasonable doubt."' 49 The Court also noted that under Article
2 of Regulation 17, an undertaking may ask the Commission for a
negative clearance in which the Commission certifies the inapplicablity of Articles 85-86 to a particular agreement or practice. 50 Although fines are not necessarily precluded by the granting of a
negative clearance,' it is very unlikely that the Commission would
impose a fine for conduct of which it had been notified, and where
a negative clearance had been granted. Of course, the negative
clearance would not apply to elements of the agreement or behavior not included in the notification.
46. United Brands Co. and United Brands Continental NV v. Commission, supra note
44, at points 299-300; Hoffman La-Roche & Co. AG v. Commission, supra note 42, at point
134.
47. In the Miller case, Advocate General Warner stated that "traders in the Community
ought to be presumed to know the law as laid down by the Treaties, by Regulations made
thereunder and perhaps by decisions of this Court." However, he did not believe that undertakings should be expected to be familiar with Commission decisions. The Commission has

taken the position that undertakings operating within the EEC should be familiar with its
decisions concerning the competition rules. See the opinion of Advocate General Warner in
Miller International Schallplatten v. Commission (Case 19/77) [1978] E.C.R. 131, [19781 2
COMM. MKT. L.R. 334, and the Commission's decision in Miller International Schallplatten,
[1976] O.J. L357/40, [19771 1 COMM. MKT. L.R. D61, at point 21 (see Appendix); Vegetable
Parchment, [1978] O.J. L70/54, [19781 1 COMM. MKT. L.R. 534, at point 83; Moat et Chandon (London) Ltd., supra note 21, at point 20.
48. Johnson & Johnson, supra note 23, at point 41.
49. Hoffman-La Roche, supra note 42, at points 129-137.
50. Article 2 of Regulation 17, supra note 8.
51. Article 15 of Regulation 17, supra note 8. See Harding, supranote 34, for a discussion of the uncertainty of the degree of legal protection resulting from a negative clearance.
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It would not be consistent with Regulation 17 to impose a fine
for an innocent or inadvertent infringement in the absence of any
negligence. This type of infringement may occur in relation to uncertain or developing areas of Community competition law. Uncertainty concerning either agreements or practices which are
prohibited by the competition rules, or the anti-competitive effect
of particular behavior may prevent the conduct from rising to the
level of an intentional infringement, or even preclude the imposition of a fine for a negligent or an intentional infringement. In the
Vegetable Parchment5 2 case, for example, the Commission decided
not to impose a fine for the exchange of information concerning
prices and export quantities. Although this constituted an infringement of Article 85, competition rules in this area were not sufficiently developed at the time the conduct occurred. The
Commission held:
The practice by members of GVPA of mutually informing each
other on their own export quantities and on the level of their
prices is an infringement which has not necessarily been committed intentionally. At the time in question the rules of competition of the EEC Treaty had not been sufficiently developed by
decisions of the Commission in this field. The conditions for imposing a fine under Article 15(2) of Regulation No. 17 are accordingly not fulfilled.5 3
However, "ignorance of [settled] law neither excuses an infringement nor converts an intentional infringement into a negligent
54
one," as Advocate General Slynn pointed out in the Pioneercase.
TIT

I'--A r~

In establishing the amount of the fine, the Commission is required to consider the gravity and the duration of the unlawful behavior.55 The gravity of the infringement will depend on the facts
and circumstances of each case. In the Quinine case, the Court
stated that the gravity of the infringement would be appraised in
light of "the nature of the restrictions on competition, the number
and size of the undertakings concerned, the respective proportions
of the market controlled by them within the Community, and the
52.
53.
54.
55.

Vegetable Parchment, supra note 47, at point 83.
Id.
Pioneer, supra note 6.
Article 15 of Regulation 17, supra note 8.
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situation of the market when the infringement was committed. 56
In other cases, additional factors have been considered in assessing
the gravity of the infringement. The main elements appear to be:
(1) the nature of the infringement, (2) the behavior and degree of
participation of each undertaking, (3) the number and size of the
participants, (4) the profit obtained from the unlawful conduct,
(5) the resulting injury to third parties such as consumers, and
(6) the legal and economic context in which the infringement was
committed.5 7
The serious nature of an infringement may be based on a finding of clearly unlawful behavior,5 8 an inherently anti-competitive
conduct,5 9 or substantial interference with the common market.6 °
Failure to notify the Commission of an agreement or practice may
also be an aggravating factor in determining the nature of an
infringement.
In recent cases, the Commission has emphasized the restrictive
nature of the conduct, as well as its anti-competitive effects in assessing the extent of the infringement. 6 ' The inherently anti-competitive nature of export bans has been referred to in several cases
which have clearly established the serious nature of this type of
infringement. In the Miller case, the Court stated that "With regard to the gravity of the infringement, the clauses prohibiting exports constitute a form of restriction which by its very nature
jeopardizes trade between Member States."' 62 In the Tepea case, the
Court described the export bans as "clear restrictions of competition which contravene one of the fundamental objectives of the
56. ACF Chemiefarma v. Commission (Case 41/69) [1970] E.C.R. 661, C.M.R. 8083, at
point 176.
57. In the Pioneer case, the Court stated that in fixing the amount of the fine, consideration should be given to all of the factors which are capable of affecting the gravity of the
infringement. Pioneer, supra note 6, at point 129.
58. Moet et Chandon, supra note 21 (failure to notify the Commission); AEG-Telefunken, supra note 19 (conduct expressly prohibited in Article 85); SSI, [19821 O.J. L232/1,
[1982] 3 COMM. MKT. L.R. 702 (conduct expressly prohibited in Article 85).
59. SSI, [1982] O.J. L 232/1, [1982] 3 COMM. MKT. L.R. 702 (price agreements); Hasselblad, [1982] O.J. L161/18, [1982] 2 COMM. MKT. L.R. 233 (partitioning markets) (see Appendix); and Miller, supra note 47 (export bans).
60. ICI Ltd. v. Commission (Case 48/69) [1972] E.C.R. 619, [19721 COMM. MKT. L.R.
557 (uniform price increases); Johnson & Johnson, supra note 23 (export bans); and Kawasaki, [1979] O.J. L16/9, [19791 I COMM. MKT. L.R. 488 (export ban).
61. SSI, supra note 58 (price agreements); Hasselblad, supra note 36 (partitioning markets); Michelin, [1981] O.J. L353/33, [1982] 1 COMM. MKT. L.R. 643 and [19821 O.J. LI 1/28
(discount policy and bonus system) (see Appendix).
62. Miller, supra note 47, at point 19.
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Treaty, namely to establish a single market in the Community."6 3
The Court affirmed the serious nature of restrictions on exports or
imports in the Pioneercase, and stated:
The Commission was right to classify as very serious infringements prohibitions on exports and imports seeking artificially to
maintain price differences between the markets of the various
Member States. Such prohibitions jeopardize the freedom of intra-Community trade, which is a fundamental principle of the
Treaty, and they prevent the attainment of one of its objectives,
namely the creation of a single market.'
The behavior and the degree of participation of each undertaking is considered in determining the appropriate fine to be imposed upon each of the participants. In the Dyestuffs case, the
Court found that the fine imposed on ICI for the uniform price
increases was appropriate "in view of the frequency and extent of
the applicant's participation in the prohibited practices." 6 5 In reviewing the relatively large fine imposed on ACF Chemiefarma in
the Quinine case for price fixing and market sharing, the Court
found that the amount was justified given the "leading part which
[ACF] played in drawing up and implementing the agreements."6 6
Undertakings which are in a position of special influence or
responsibility may be subject to higher fines for their participation
in unlawful conduct.6 7 In the Pioneer case, a substantially higher
fine was imposed on the Pioneer company, which is the Japanese
manufacturer's wholly-owned European subsidiary responsible for
coordinating distribution in Europe. In discussing the appropriateness of the fine, the Court took the special position of the Pioneer
company into account, and noted:
As regards Pioneer, regard must be had particularly to the central position which that undertaking occupies in the distribution
network of the products in question, which enabled it to play the
role of intermediary in exerting considerable influence on the
conduct of national distributors.6 8
63. Tepea v. Commission (Case 28/77) [1978] E.C.R. 1391, [1978] 3 COMM. MKT. L.R.
392, at point 65.
64. Pioneer, supra note 6, at point 107.
65. ICI Ltd. v. Commission (Case 48/69) [1972] E.C.R. 619, [1972] COMM. MKT. L.R.
557, at point 147.
66. ACF Chemiefarma, supra note 56, at point 186.
67. BMW, supra note 34, at point 51 (higher fines imposed on dealer-members of the
Advisory Committee); and NAVEWA-ANSEAU, supra note 16, at point 75 (ANSEAU entrusted to provide services by the public authorities).
68. Pioneer, supra note 6, at point 132.
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In other cases, the Commission has not imposed any fine on
undertakings which played an insignificant role in the infringement. In the NAVEWA-ANSEA U case, which involved restriction
of parallel imports, fines were not imposed on the undertakings
which "took no initiative in the drawing-up of the agreement and
were practically obliged to participate. ' ' "9 The Commission did not
impose fines on the dealers in the Kawasaki case, who were direct
participants in the export bans, because the restrictions were in fact
against their interests.70 In the Floralcase, the Commission stated
that "[n]o fine need be imposed on Firma Schiffer, which is now the
sole shareholder in Floral, since Firma Schiffer was only a minor
instrument of the anti-competitive cooperation between the three
French manufacturers." 7 1 Similarly, the Commission did not impose fines for the market partitions in the Hasselbladcase on the
undertakings whose behavior was not "directly related to the hindrance of parallel imports. 7 2
Other elements relating to the conduct of the participant which
have affected the gravity of the infringement and the amount of the
fine include the knowing continuation, enforcement, and implementation of the unlawful restriction. In determining the gravity of
the infringement in the Johnson & Johnson case, the Commission
noted the determined and vigorous efforts that were made to prevent exports, and the continuation of the export bans after one of
the undertakings was admittedly aware of their illegality.7 3 In the
Preserved Mushrooms case,74 the Commission imposed a fine for
the restrictive agreement, notwithstanding the market conditions
which precluded the agreement from having a significant effect.
This decision was largely due to the parties' clear intention to divide the market in violation of Article 85, which was apparent from
the fact that the agreement was fully implemented.7 5
The number and the size of the participants may also be signif69. NAVEWA-ANSEAU, supra note 16, at point 74; see also Windsurfing, [1983] O.J.
L229/1, [1984] 1 COMM. MKT. L.R. I (no fines imposed on patent licensees for restrictive
clauses in patent licensing agreements).
70. Kawasaki, [1979] O.J. L16/9, [1979] 1 COMM. MKT. L.R. 448.
71. Floral, supra note 13.
72. Hasselblad, supra note 36, at point 79.
73. Johnson & Johnson, supra note 23; see also Tepea, supra note 63 (knowingly continue restrictive conduct); Kawasaki, supra note 70 ("Kawasaki Motoren GmbH sought to
prevent exports by dealers in a determined and vigorous manner") at point 60.
74. Preserved Mushrooms, [1975] O.J. L29/26, [1975] 1 COMM. MKT. L.R. D83 (see

Appendix).
75. Id.
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icant factors in determining the effects of the infringement on the
relevant market. For example, the number of participants who engaged in the market sharing arrangement in the PreservedMushrooms case was an important factor in assessing the gravity of the
infringement. The Commission stated:
The gravity of this infringement lies in the fact that it is completely contrary to the object of creating a single market, [and]
that it constitutes a sharing of the market accompanied by a fixing of sales prices in which virtually all the producers or suppliers in business on the relevant market at the time were
involved.7 6
The relevance of the size of the participant in relation to the
gravity of the infringement was discussed in the Pioneer case, in
which the Court considered the "size and economic power of the
undertaking and, consequently the influence which the undertaking
was able to exert on the market.""' The size of the participants was
also a significant factor in determining the gravity of the export
cartel in the Floralcase, in which the Commission commented:
As regards the gravity of the infringement, regard must be had
[sic] to the fact that the pooling of deliveries by the three largest
manufacturers in one Member State on the market of another
Member State virtually eliminates all the competition between
them on that market.7 8
The size of the undertaking may be considered in terms of its
market share or turnover. In several cases, the Commission has
considered the total turnover and the affected turnover in determining the gravity of the infringement. In assessing the gravity of the
abusive practices in the United Brands case, the Commission took
into account "UBC's total annual turnover of about two billion dollars, and its annual turnover in bananas of fifty million dollars on
the relevant market. ' 79 In fixing the amount of the fine imposed
for the export cartel in the Floralcase, the Commission considered
"the relatively small turnover achieved by the manufacturers via
Floral, without, however, ignoring completely their importance in
the total market for compound fertilizers." 80
In the Pioneer case, the Court stressed the number of factors
which may be relevant in assessing the gravity of an infringement,
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Pioneer, supra note 6, at point 120.
Floral, supra note 13.
United Brands, supra note 44, at point 296.
Floral, supra note 13.
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yet cautioned against placing too much emphasis on the figures
provided by both the total turnover and the turnover affected by
the infringement. At the same time, the Court confirmed the propriety of considering these figures, stating that:
It is permissible, for the purpose of fixing the fine, to have regard
both to the total turnover of the undertaking, which gives an indication, albeit approximate and imperfect, of the size of the undertaking and of its economic power, and to the proportion of
that turnover accounted for by the goods in respect of which the
infringement was committed,
which gives an indication of the
81
scale of the infringement.
The profits derived from the unlawful conduct may be considered in establishing the degree of an infringement.82 In the United
Brands case, the Commission considered the "high profits made as
a result of the pricing policy,"8 3 and in the Kawasaki case,84 noted
that "A considerable profit was made solely because of an export
prohibition which infringed Article 85(1)." For the purpose of establishing the fines in the Floralcase, the fact that the participants
shared equally in the profits received from the export cartel was
considered to be more important than the quantities each distributed through the cartel.8 5
The injury to third persons, such as consumers or competitors,
resulting from the anti-competitive behavior is another possible
factor in determining the gravity of an infringement. In the United
Brands case, the fact that the product was widely consumed was
taken into consideration in assessing the harmful effects of the abusive practices. 86 The serious nature of the market partitions in the
81. Pioneer, supra note 6, at point 121. The Court also stated that "the fixing of an
appropriate fine cannot be the result of a simple calculation based on the total turnover."
82. Pioneer, supra note 6, at point 129. See Lang, EEC Finesfor Restrictive Practices
and Abuses ofDominant Position, 75 LAW Soc. GAZ. 1094 (1978). Temple Lang indicates
that the fine imposed should not be less than the profits received from the infringement. "It
would clearly be a guarantee of an ineffectual anti-trust law if fines were consistently less
than the profits derived from clearly unlawful behavior. Therefore, in cases where it is reasonably clear that the companies knew that they were acting contrary to the EEC Treaty, it
seems reasonable that the fine on each company should (subject to all other relevant factors)
be approximately equal to the profit it made for the unlawful behavior, when that can be
estimated. Restrictive practices are not crimes, but they should not be allowed to pay,
either." Kerse suggests that there was a direct relationship between the profit and the fine in
the Kawasaki case. See KERSE, supra note 6, at 183.
83. United Brands, supra note 44, at point 296.
84. Kawasaki, supra note 70, at point 58.
85. Floral, supra note 13.
86. United Brands, supranote 44, at point 290.
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Hasselbladcasewas partially due to the injury caused to consumers
and dealers. The Commission noted:
Infringements of this kind are inherently likely to have substantial effects on prices to users in the Community. The goods concerned in this case are not in mass consumption, but they are of
very high unit value and the impact of the infringements on even
a relatively small number of users is therefore considerable.
Many users are professional photographers, for87whom a Hasselblad camera may be an essential working tool.
With regard to the harm suffered by the dealers who were unable to
obtain Hasselblad products, the Commission considered the economic loss in terms of actual or potential turnover in those products
and the potential loss of customers due to a decrease in prestige.
The gravity of the infringement is considered less severe in the
absence of any significant loss to consumers or to competitors. In
the Floral case, for example, the Commission noted the minimal
effect which the export cartel had on product users.8 8 In the Tepea
case, the Court stated that the product which was the subject of the
export ban was of relatively small importance to the ordinary consumer and represented only a small item of expenditure.8 9 Similarly, in the Sugar case, the homogeneous nature of the product
lessened the injury to consumers resulting from the infringements. 90
The legal and economic context of an infringement may also
affect the gravity of an infringement. In recent cases, the Commission has expressly stated that the amount of the fines should be
sufficient to deter any recurrence. 9 ' The fact that the Commission
has not imposed fines for similar conduct in previous cases will not
preclude the imposition o.
f a tie in .an .appropriatcase. 92 Similarly, the Commission is not limited by the level of fines imposed in
prior cases. In the Pioneercase, the Court affirmed the propriety of
87. Hasselblad, supra note 36, at point 76.
88. Floral, supra note 13.
89. Tepea, supra note 63, at points 66-67.
90. Sugar case, supra note 13.
91. See Johnson & Johnson, supra note 23, at point 50: "The Commission also takes
into account the size of the Johnson & Johnson group and the need to suppress unlawful
activities and to prevent any recurrence, and the resulting need for a fine large enough to be
a deterrent to such an enterprise." See also Hasselblad, supranote 36, at point 78: "In fixing
the amount of the fines, the Commission has also considered the respective sizes of the undertakings and the necessity of dissuading the undertakings from repeating the
infringements."
92. See BMW, supra note 34, at point 53. The Court rejected the dealers' argument that
the Commission's fines violated the principle of non-discrimination because the Commission
had not imposed fines on dealers in previous similar cases.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,

17

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 14, No. 3 [], Art. 3
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 14

considering the level of compliance with the competition rules and
the need for deterrence as part of the legal context in determining
the appropriate fine in relation to the gravity of the infringement.9 3
The importance of the legal and economic context of the infringement was illustrated in the Sugar case, in which the fines were
quashed or substantially reduced. The Court found that the Commission had failed to give sufficient consideration to the national
quotas and price guidelines in analyzing the abusive practices. The
Court stated that any decision as to the amount of the fine would
have to take into account the stable market conditions in the Community sugar industry, due to the partitioning effect of national
quotas on the market. The market situation contributed to the unlawful practices because competition was already severely restricted
in terms of production, the competitors were aware of the production limits imposed on each of them, and the only way to increase
profits under the system was through higher prices.9 4
IV.

MITIGATING FACTORS

A lower fine may be imposed due to the presence of mitigating
factors.9 5 The most common mitigating factor is voluntary compliance with the competition rules before the Commission issues its
decision.9 6 In the Floralcase, which involved an export cartel, the
Commission stated that it had "taken into account the fact that the
manufacturers concerned have, without waiting for the Commission's Decision, ended their involvement in Floral and so have
taken the first step towards ending their infringement."9 7 In the
Hoffman-La Roche case, the Court noted that "as far back as the
stage of the administrative procedure Roche stated that it was
93. Pioneer, supra note 6, at points 106-109.
94. Sugar case, supra note 13, at points 612-620. See also United Brands, supra note 44,
at point 290.
95. Vegetable Parchment, supra note 47 (no fine imposed for one infringement due to
minimal harm to consumers and efforts to suspend customs duties); BMW, supra note 34
(economic dependence of dealers); ACF Chemiefarma, supra note 56 (cartel member favored
low prices); Preserved Mushrooms, supra note 74 (anticipated market disturbances were not
a mitigating factor); Kawasaki, supra note 70 (notified Commission of agreement pursuant to
Art. 4, Reg. 17); Toltecs/Dorcet, [1982] O.J. L379/19, [1983] 1 COMM. MKT. L.R. 412 (trade
mark no-challenge clause, first fine imposed with regard to industrial property rights); Windsurfing, 11983] O.J. L229/1, [1984] 1 COMM. MKT. L.R. I (restrictive clauses in patent licensing agreements, first fine imposed with regard to patents).
96. See, e.g., United Brands, supra note 44 (Commission indicated should have acted
sooner); Hoffman-La Roche, supra note 42; Kawasaki, supra note 70; and Floral, supranote
13.
97. Floral, supra note 13.
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them in
ready to amend the contracts at issue and in fact amended
98
departments.
Commission's
the
with
conjunction
In the absence of conduct which is clearly anti-competitive or
unlawful, reasonable reliance on competent legal advice may also
be a mitigating factor in a subsequent proceeding. It is recognized
that the client who is making a good faith effort to comply with the
law must be distinguished from one who is merely attempting to
use legal advice as a shield for anti-competitive activities. In the
Miller case, for example, the Court held that the obviously incorrect
statements of a legal advisor concerning the applicability of the
competition rules were not a mitigating factor. The undertaking
was held to have intentionally infringed upon the Treaty, based on
a finding that it could not have been unaware of the anti-competitive object of its conduct. 99 Nonetheless, the Commission has recognized the value of competent legal advice in facilitating
voluntary compliance. In the National Panasoniccase, the Commission did not impose an otherwise justifiably substantial fine for
the export prohibition because the companies "adopted a comprehensive, practical, detailed and carefully considered antitrust compliance programme, with appropriate legal advice."' 0 0
In two recent cases, the Commission has imposed lower fines
due to the financial position of the undertakings at the time of the
decision. In the IPTC Belgium case, the Commission imposed a
lower fine on IPTC for its participation in the NAVEWA-ANSEAU
agreements to restrict parallel imports because of the "drastically
reduced scale of IPTC's overall business."' 0° IPTC had sold part of
its assets to another undertaking which also participated in the infringement. The other recent case, Cast Iron and Steel Rolls, 2 entailed price collaboration and market sharing arrangements which
involved virtually the entire industry in the Community, and persisted for twelve years. Given the nature and the considerable duration of the infringements, substantial fines would have been
expected. The Commission stated that it was imposing considera98. Hoffman-La Roche, supra note 42. In the Commercial Solvents case the Court
noted that compliance with the Commission's decision had limited the harmful effect of the
unlawful conduct. Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and Commercial Solvents Corp. v.
Commission (Cases 6 and 7/73) [1974] E.C.R. 223, [1974] 1 COMM. MKT. L.R. 309.
99. Miller, supra note 47; see also BMW, supranote 34; ACF Chemiefarma, supranote
56.
100. National Panasonic (UK) Ltd., [19821 O.J. L354/28, [1983] 1 COMM. MKT. L.R. 497,
at points 67-68 (see Appendix).
101. IPTC Belgium, [19831 O.J. L376/77, at point 19.
102. Cast Iron and Steel Rolls, [1983] O.J. L317/I, [1984] I COMM. MKT. L.R. 694.
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bly lower fines than would normally be justified because of the
grave financial situation of the steel industry within the
Community.
The parties have, in general, incurred persistent losses during the last few years, largely owing to the declining market represented by their main customer, the steel industry.
Consequently, their financial situation has deteriorated and is
now grave.
The parties are taking steps within the Treaty and are in
consultation with the Commission in order to restructure and reduce the size of their operations in an effort to restore their economic health. This process is imposing an additional
financial
10 3
strain on the resources of the companies concerned.
The Court has also indicated that it may reduce a fine if there
is sufficient evidence that it is excessive in relation to the financial
position of the undertaking. This would be consistent with the
principle of proportionality and the Court's broad powers of review
with regard to the fines imposed in competition cases.'0 4
V.

DURATION

The duration of the infringement may be a significant factor in
the decision to impose a fine and in determining its appropriate
amount. For example, the Commission decided not to impose a
fine in the Italian Flat Glass case 10 5 because the restrictions were
not extensively enforced or fully implemented during the relatively
short duration of the infringement. The fine in the Commercial
Solvents case was reduced by the Court due to a finding that the
duration of the infringement would have been less if the Commis10 6
sion had acted faster in response to a complaint.
The duration of the infringement may affect various aspects of
the gravity of the offense, such as the injury suffered by consumers.
However, the duration is considered as a separate factor in determining the amount of the fine. The parties must be informed of the
duration of the alleged infringement in the statement of objections.
If, in the course of the proceeding the Commission wishes to extend
the period of the infringement, the parties must be informed and
given an opportunity to comment on it. In the Pioneer case, the
103. Id. at points 72 and 73.
104. Miller, supra note 47. The Court stated that it might consider the undertaking's
ability to pay the fine in the presence of the necessary supporting documents.
105. Italian Flat Glass, [1981] O.J. L326/32.
106. Commercial Solvents, supra note 98.
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fines were substantially reduced by the Court due to the Commission's failure to inform the parties of its intention to increase the
duration of the alleged infringements. The Court reduced the duration of the infringement for which the parties could be held responsible under the Commission's decision, and lowered the fine to
an amount in proportion to the shorter infringement. 017 However,
an insubstantial reduction in the duration of the infringement,
which did not appreciably diminish the restrictions of competition
resulting from the unlawful conduct, would0 justify
only a slight re8
duction, if any, in the amount of the fine.'
The duration of the infringement for which a fine may be imposed does not include the periods of time during which the conduct in question was brought to the attention of the Commission
for the purpose of requesting an 85(3) exemption.' 09 However, in
the Pittsburgh Corning case, 0" which involved a discriminatory
pricing policy, the Commission imposed a fine for the duration of
the infringement prior to notification. The undertaking will only
benefit from the protection of a notification if its conduct is consistent with the agreement or practice which is described in the notification. The Commission imposed a fine in the AEG-Telefunken
case for a selective distribution system which violated Article 85
because the system was applied in a restrictive manner that went
beyond the conduct described in the notification, and was in fact
inconsistent with the information provided therein."' In the Hasselbladcase, the undertakings were not allowed to rely on ambiguities in the notified agreement which did not inform the Commission
of the existence of export bans." t2 The protection from fines is terminated once the Commission informs the parties that an exemption does not appear to be justified based on the notified
107. Pioneer, supra note 6, at points 15-17.
108. Boehringer Mannheim GmbH v. Commission, supra note 10, at point 59; Tepea v.
Commission, supra note 63 (see Appendix).
109. Article 15 of Regulation 17, supra note 8. Under Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty,
restrictive conduct which falls under the prohibition of 85(l) may be exempted from the
application of the competition rules if the benefits of the conduct outweigh its detrimental
effect on competition. The parties must notify the Commission of the agreement or the conduct in question and request an 85(3) exemption pursuant to Article 4 of Regulation 17. See
United Brands, supra note 44, at point 292.
110. Pittsburgh Coming Europe, 11972] J.O. L272/35, (19731 COMM. MKT. L.R. D2.
11. AEG-Telefunken, supranote 19. See also Theal/Watts, [ 1977] O.J. L39/19, 11977] I
COMM. MKT. L.R. D44 (fine imposed due to export ban and exclusive trademark rights
which were not notified) (see Appendix).
112. Hasselblad, supra note 36.
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VI.

THE AMOUNT OF THE FINE

The fines imposed for infringements of Articles 85-86 range
from one thousand to one million units of account, or an amount in
excess thereof, but not exceeding ten percent of the turnover of the
participating undertaking for the preceding business year. In the
Pioneercase, the Court for the first time clearly established the total
turnover of the undertaking as the relevant figure for determining
the alternative ten percent maximum fine.
[The] only express reference [in Regulation 17] to the turnover of
the undertaking concerns the upper limit of a fine exceeding
1,000,000 Units of Account. In such a case the limit seeks to
prevent fines from being disproportionate in relation to the size
of the undertaking and, since only the total turnover can effectively give an approximate indication of that size, the aforementioned percentage must, as the Commission14 has argued, be
understood as referring to the total turnover."
Thus the turnover for computing the higher ten percent maximum fine would include the total turnover for all products, not just
the turnover affected by the infringement, and for activities in all
parts of the world, not just the turnover within the European Community. A fine representing ten percent of the undertaking's turnover for the preceding business year is a considerable amount, and
therefore a considerable deterrent for any company. In the case of
a large multinational company the ten percent maximum fine is
clearly a very substantial amount.
The relationship between the amount of the fine and the nature of the infringement was discussed by Advocate General
Warner in the BMW case:
The Commission's discretion as to the amount of a fine should
therefore be taken to lie in the range between 0% and 10% of the
turnover of the undertaking concerned; that a fine of 10% of
turnover should be taken to be appropriate to an intentional infringement of the gravest kind and of considerable duration,
whilst, at the other end of the scale, a fine of less than 1%would
be appropriate for a merely negligent infringement of the most
trivial kind and continuing only for a short time, in a case where,
nonetheless, the circumstances warranted the imposition of some
113. Article 15 of Regulation 17, supra note 8.
114. Pioneer, supra note 6, at point 119.
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15

The Commission may first consider the infringement as a
whole and set an aggregate amount for the fine, a portion of which
is then allocated to each of the undertakings based on its individual
role and participation in the infringement. This method of calculating the fine may be appropriate in cases where a large number of
undertakings participated in the infringement." 6 Similarly, the
Commission may impose a single fine for several infringements
committed by an undertaking. In the United Brands case, for example, the Court upheld a single fine imposed for three abusive
practices."' However, in the Pioneer case, the Court affirmed the
imposition of a single fine for related infringements which were
treated as a single offense, without ruling on the question of overlapping fines for separate infringements."I 8
The Pioneer case represents the highest fines imposed by the
Commission in terms of the absolute amount or the percentage of
the participant's turnover." 9 Since 1969, when the Commission
first imposed a fine under Regulation 17,12° the Commission has
imposed fines in over 30 cases. As the Pioneer case clearly demonstrates, the level of the fines has increased with the development of
well-established principles of Community competition law. It is
now clear that in an appropriate case involving a very serious infringement the Commission would have the power to impose a fine
representing ten percent of the participant's worldwide turnover for
the preceding year. The Court stated:
It was open to the Commission to have regard to the fact that
practices of this nature, although they were established as being
unlawful at the Outset Of Community competition policy, are still
relatively frequent on account of the profit that certain of the
undertakings concerned are able to derive from them and, consequently, it was open to the Commission to consider that it was
appropriate to raise the level of fines so as to reinforce their de115. BMW Belgium SA and others v. Commission (Cases 32/78 and 36-82/78), [1979]
E.C.R. 2435, [1980] 1 COMM. MKT. L.R. 370, at 2493; see Lang, Compliance with the Common
Market Antitrust Law, 14 INT'L L.J. 485 (1980). "Fines have not been calculated primarily by
reference to turnover."
116. ICI Ltd. v. Commission (Case 48/69) [1972] E.C.R. 619, [19721 COMM. MKT. L.R.
557; Boehringer Mannheim GmbH v. Commission, supra note 10, at points 54-56.
117. United Brands, supra note 44.
118. Pioneer, supra note 6, at point 127. Also see the Sugar case, supra note 13, in which
the Commission took into account other infringements for which no separate fine was
imposed.
119. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
120. Regulation 17 came into force in 1962.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,

23

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 14, No. 3 [], Art. 3
CALIFORNIA WESTERN

INTERNATIONAL

LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 14

terrent effect. For the same reasons, the fact that the Commission, in the past, imposed fines of a certain level for certain types
of infringement does not mean that it is estopped from raising
that level within the limits indicated in Regulation No. 17 if that
is necessary to ensure the implementation of Community competition policy. On the contrary, the proper application of the
Community competition rules requires that the Commission may
at any time adjust the level of fines to the needs of that policy. 121

The fines, which have been expressed in European units of account, are now stated in terms of European currency units
(ECU), 2 2 as well as the national currency associated with the undertaking. 2 3 The amount expressed in the national currency represents the participant's actual obligation. The Commission may
accept payment in another currency, but it is not required to do
SO. 124

VII.

PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS

The Commission has to comply with certain procedural requirements in exercising its power to impose a fine.' 25 The undertakings, or the associations of undertakings alleged to have
violated the competition rules, must receive a written statement of
objections from the Commission. 26 The parties will be informed
of the Commission's intention to impose a fine, either in the initial
statement of objections, or in a supplementary statement. The parties are given an opportunity to present their views in writing
121. Pioneer, supra note 6, at points 108-109.
122. The value of the European currency unit, which is published in the Official Journal,
is fixed on a daily basis by reference to a basket of currencies. See Financial Regulation of
21 December 1977, [1977] O.J. L356/1. One ECU was equal to 0.937945 US dollars on
January 31, 1983. A change in the value of the ECU from the time the Commission imposes
a fine to the time of the Court's decision may have a substantial effect on the fine. In the
Pioneer case, the ECU went from the equivalent of 1.42931 US dollars in December, 1979,
when the Commission imposed the fines, to 0.889546 US dollars in June, 1983, when the
Court issued its decision reducing the fines. However, the fines in the Pioneer case were not
expressed in dollars.
123. See Answer to Written Question No. 584/76 [1977] O.J. C27/15.
124. See the Sugar case, supra note 13.
125. In the Pioneer case the Court rejected procedural claims based on Article 6 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights in holding that the Commission is
not a "tribunal" within the meaning of Article 6. The Court stated that the Commission is
required to comply with the procedural safeguards provided for by Community law as part
of the fundamental right to a fair hearing. For a discussion of the procedural requirements
in competition cases see Pioneer, supra note 6, at points 6-33.
126. Article 2 of Regulation 99, J.O. 2268/63; O.J. (Special Edition) 1963-64, at 47.
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within a time limit set out in the notice of objections. 127 In fixing
the time limit, the Commission considers both the time required for
preparing a response, and the urgency of the case. The parties are
entitled to a period of at least two weeks in which they may submit
their written response, and this period may be extended. 128 The
parties may also request an oral hearing as a matter of right if the
Commission intends to impose a fine.' 29 The Commission's decision must be limited to the objections on which the parties have
30
had an opportunity to present their views.'
The Commission is required to state the reasons for its decision under Article 190 of the EEC Treaty. In the Quinine case, the
Court indicated that this is particularly important with respect to
the reasons for a decision which imposes a fine. The Commission
must clearly and coherently indicate the factual and legal considerations which serve as the basis for a decision imposing a fine, so
3
that the essential factors of the Commission's reasoning are clear. ' '
The enforcement of the Commission's obligation to provide legally
sufficient reasons for its decisions is a fundamental right of the defense and a prerequisite for the Court's supervisory role. Failure to
give adequate justification for a decision is a sufficient basis for
32
annulment.!
The Commission's power to impose a fine for a substantive
infringement of the competition rules is subject to a five year limitation period. 33 The Commission may impose a fine for an infringement even if the unlawful behavior and its anti-competitive
effects have ended before the Commission initiates its investigation,
127. Article 19 of Regulation 17, spra note 8, and Articles 2-3 Of
~gaio 99,
note 126.
128. Article II of Regulation 99, supra note 126.
129. Article 19 of Regulation 17, supranote 8; Article 7 of Regulation 99, supra note 126.
130. Id.; Article 4 of Regulation 99, supra note 126.
131. ACF Chemiefarma v. Commission, supra note 56.
132. When the Commission imposes a decision which goes beyond the established line of
cases it must "give an account of its reasoning." In Groupement des Fabricants de Papiers
Peints de Belgique v. Commission (Case 73/74) [1975] E.C.R. 1491, [1976] I COMM. MKT.
L.R. 589, the Commission's decision was annulled due to the failure to give adequate reasons
for the decision as required by Article 190.
133. Article I of Regulation 2988, [1974] O.J. L319/1. The Commission is only precluded from imposing a fine after the five year period has lapsed. The Commission may
declare the unlawfulness of an agreement, which would establish its nullity under Article 85,
or require remedial actions. Kerse suggests that the Commission may also be able to order
the divestiture of a merger or the termination of a joint venture beyond the statutory period
for imposing a fine. The restrictive agreements or practices may be considered to be continuing or repeated infringements, in which case the limitation period would not begin until the
behavior had terminated. See KERSE, supra note 6, at 193.
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as long as action is taken within the statutory period. 134 Time begins to run from the day the infringement is committed, or in the
case of continuous or repeated infringements, from the day the infringement ceases. The statute of limitations is satisfied if the Commission, or a Member State acting at the request of the
Commission, takes any action pursuant to an investigation or a
within
proceeding against any one of the participating undertakings
35
infringement.
the
of
termination
the
after
years
five
The limitation period is interrupted from the time that one of
the participants receives notice of (1) the Commission's request for
information, (2) the authorization for an investigation by the national authorities, (3) the commencement of proceedings, or (4) the
filing of a statement of objections. With each action taken by either
the Commission or a Member State the statute begins to run again.
However, there is a maximum limit of ten years, or double the statutory period, in which the Commission may fine an undertaking for
an infringement. This protects the undertakings from the cost and
the inconvenience of an unreasonably lengthy proceeding.' 3 6 The
limitation period is suspended during the time in which the Commission's decision is subject to proceedings before the Court. The
decision itself remains in force pending the outcome of the Court
proceeding unless the parties make a separate application to the
Court requesting the suspension of the decision.'3 7
Once a decision to impose a fine becomes final the Commission has a five year period to enforce its sanction. 138 The enforcement of the fines imposed by the Commission in competition cases
is governed by Article 192 of the EEC Treaty, which provides for
the enforcement of Commission decisions in the Member States
134. ACF Chemiefarma and Others v. Commission (Cases 41, 44 and 45/69) [19701
E.C.R. 661, C.M.R. 8083. See in particular Case 41/69, at point 175 (see Appendix). "The
Commission's power to impose penalties is in no way affected by the fact that the conduct
constituting the infringements has ceased and that it can no longer have detrimental effects."
135. Articles I and 2 of Regulation 2988, supra note 133. The Commission apparently
has the power to impose a fine based on the entire duration of the infringement even in
excess of five years if it takes action within the statutory period. KERSE, supra note 6, at 167;
Lang, EEC Finesfor Restrictive Practices and Abuses of Dominant Position, 75 LAW Soc.
GAZ. 1094 (1978).
136. Article 2 of Regulation 2988, supra note 133.
137. Articles 3 and 6 of Regulation 2988, supra note 133.
138. Articles 4, 5, and 6 of Regulation 2988, supra note 133. Article 6 states that "the
limitation period for enforcement of sanctions shall be suspended for so long as: time is
allowed to pay; or enforcement of payment is suspended pursuant to a decision of the
Court."
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pursuant to the national rules of civil procedure.' 39 The undertakings found to have violated the competition rules have usually paid
the fines imposed by the Commission. 4 ° Normally the decision
will provide that payment should be placed in a specified bank account in the Member State which the undertaking is associated
with within three months after the undertaking has received notice
of the decision.' 4' The Commission may allow the fine to be paid
in installments over a period of time if the financial status of the
undertaking justifies such an arrangement. 142 Payment may be required even if the Commission's decision is before the Court on
appeal.14 3 However, the Commission has recently instituted a new
practice where it agrees to postpone the obligation of payment during an appeal, provided the undertaking provides a bank guarantee
for the amount of the fine plus interest.'"
The Court has unlimited jurisdiction to review the factual and
the legal basis for a decision of the Commission which imposes a
fine. The Court may "cancel, reduce, or increase the fine."' 145 In
practice, the Court has cancelled or reduced the amount of the fine
in several cases. The Court has not exercised its power to increase
the amount of the fine, and it seems unlikely that it will do so given
the increasingly high level of fines imposed by the Commission.
139. Article 192 of the EEC Treaty states that:
Decisions of the Council or of the Commission which impose a pecuniary obligation on persons other than States shall be enforceable. Enforcement shall be governed by the rules of civil procedure in force in the State in the territory of which it
is carried out. The order for its enforcement shall be appended to the decision,
without other formality than verification of the authenticity of the decision, by the
national authority which the Government of each Member State shal designate for
this purpose . . .[being required for enforcement.]

140. Answer to Written Question No. 715/80 [1980] O.J. C245/15.
141. The decision in the Johnson & Johnson case, which was addressed to the U.S. parent company and its European subsidiaries nominated for payment bank accounts in each of
the countries in which the companies are located, including two countries outside of the EEC
(USA and Switzerland). Johnson & Johnson, supra note 23.
142. Preserved Mushrooms, supra note 74. However, two of the undertakings concerned
went into liquidation proceedings in which the Commission then submitted its claim.
143. See supra note 133.
144. Answer to Written Question 1406/81 [19811 O.J. C47/28. For a discussion of the
Commission's new practice concerning the fines in cases pending appeal, and the approval of
the Court of Justice, see the EEC Commission's Twelfth Report on Competition Policy
(1982), at points 60-61.
145. Article 17 of Regulation 17, supra note 8; Article 172 of the EEC Treaty. In the
Pioneer decision the Court gave a detailed analysis of the factual, substantive, and procedural issues raised by the parties. Pioneer, supra note 6.
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THE ROLE OF THE MEMBER STATES

The Commission's proceedings are carried out in close cooperation with the competent authorities of the Member States, all of
which receive a copy of the statement of objections and other important documents. The oral hearing is attended by representatives
of the national authorities, who may express their views on the proceedings. Once the oral hearing is completed, the Commission is
required to consult the Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Monopolies, which consists of expert representatives of
the Member States, before issuing a decision which imposes a
fine. 146
The Commission's consultation with the Advisory Committee
takes place at a joint meeting convened by the Commission. This
meeting does not require the attendance of all of the Committee
members. 147 At least two weeks before the meeting the Committee
members receive a notice which is accompanied by a summary of
the case, a record of the oral hearing, the most important documents, and a preliminary draft decision. 4 8 The Commission must
inform the Committee of its intention to impose a fine and the proposed amount. 149 The Committee members may question the
Commission as to the propriety of imposing a fine, the proposed
amount, and the factors considered in determining the amount in
that particular case. The Committee submits a written report,
which is annexed to the preliminary draft decision and sent to the
Commissioners. 50 This procedure ensures the Commission's consideration of the views of the Member States in deciding competition cases, yet the Commission is not required to follow the advice
of the Committee. Nevertheless, failure to consult the Advisory
Committee, or procedural irregularities on the part of the Committee, may be considered a violation of an essential procedural re146. Articles 10 and 15 of Regulation 17, supranote 8; the Preamble and Articles I and 8
of Regulation 99, supra note 126.
147. Article 10 of Regulation 17, supranote 8. For an excellent discussion of the role and
the procedure of the Advisory Committee; see C. KERSE, EEC ANTITRUST PROCEDURE
(1981) and the 1982 and 1984 supplements by the same title.
148. Article 10 of Regulation 17, supranote 8; see Advocate General Warner's opinion in
Distillers v. Commission (Case 30/78) [19801 3 COMM. MKT. L.R. 121 (minutes of the oral
hearing must be made available to the Committee).
149. ACF Chemiefarma and Others v. Commission (Cases 41, 44 and 45/69) [1970]
E.C.R. 661, C.M.R. 8083. See Boehringer v. Commission (Case 45/69) [1970] E.C.R. 769 at
801.
150. Article 10 of Regulation 17, supra note 8.
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quirement necessary to vitiate the Commission's decision.' 5 '
Interestingly the Committee's report is not made available to
the public or the undertakings concerned, and this has raised questions concerning the rights of the defendant in EEC competition
cases. 152 In the Pioneercase, the Court held that the non-disclosure
of the opinion of the Advisory Committee is not a violation of the
fundamental right to a fair hearing, as long as the parties have been
given an opportunity to present their views on the facts which serve
as the basis for the Commission's decision. The Court said:
The consultation of the Advisory Committee represents the final
stage of the procedure before the adoption of the decision and
the opinion is given on the basis of a draft of the decision. To
give the undertakings the opportunity of making their views
known on that opinion and, therefore, on the draft decision
would amount to reopening the previous stage of the procedure,
which would be contrary to the system intended by the regulation. The failure to disclose the opinion is not contrary to the
principle of the right to a fair hearing. . . Whatever may be the
committee's opinion, the Commission may base its decision only
have had the opportunity
upon facts on which the undertakings
53
of making known their views.'

Thus, it is believed that the confidential nature of the consultation
and the Committee's report serves to promote a candid discussion
between the Commission and the representatives of the Member
States.
The Commission may impose a fine for unlawful conduct
which has already been the subject of a fine imposed under natIonal law. The Court has held that anti-competitive conduct may
give rise to penalties under national law as well as Community law.
Since this creates the possibility of "double jeopardy,"' 1 4 the Com151. Article 10 of Regulation 17, supranote 8. Harding suggests that the failure to consult the Advisory Committee may be a transgression of an essential procedural requirement
which would allow the parties to challenge the decision pursuant to Article 173 of the EEC
Treaty. This Article empowers the Court to review decisions of the Commission for the
"infringement of an essential procedural requirement." See Harding, supra note 34, at 612.
152. Advocate General Warner has expressed concern over the secrecy of the Committee's report in relation to the rights of the defense. See, e.g., Distiller's case, supra note 148;
and the opinion of Advocate General Gand in the Quinine case, supra note 149.
153. Pioneer, supra note 6, at points 34-36.
154. Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt (Case 14/68) 15 Recueil 1970, page 733 at 765; [1969]
E.C.R. 1; [19691 COMM. MKT. L.R. 100. The national courts also have jurisdiction to enforce
the EEC competition rules provided by Articles 85-86. However, only the Commission has
the authority to impose fines for infringements of these rules pursuant to Article 15(2) of
Regulation 17.
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mission must consider whether a fine imposed in a Member State is
for the same behavior. This is not necessarily true if a fine has been
imposed by a non-Member State. In the Boehringer case, the Court
held that the Commission did not have to consider the fine imposed
in the United States for the same anti-competitive agreements, as
the fines were not imposed for the same acts. The Court noted the
difference in the object and the geographical emphasis of the
laws.'

55

There is reason to believe that private damages may be
awarded in the national courts for injury caused by unlawful behavior under Articles 85-86.156 Private claims for damages would
not limit the Commission's power to impose fines for the same unlawful conduct, and would not necessarily affect the amount of the
fine. 1 57 Anti-competitive conduct may result in a profit to the participants or a loss to consumers, in addition to the harm suffered by
a competitor who brings an action for damages. Awarding private
damages would not subject the undertaking to a double penalty because damages, which are imposed to compensate the injured party,
would not be considered to be a penalty.
IX.

INFORMAL DECISIONS AND SETTLEMENTS

It is possible to avoid a fine by reaching an informal settlement
with the Commission. Approximately 90% of the competition cases
handled by the Commission are resolved in this manner. 5 8 Article
3 of Regulation 17 empowers the Commission to send recommen155. Boehringer Mannheim GmbH v. Commission (Case 7/72) [19721 E.C.R. 1281.
156. A study carried out by the Commission in 1966 concluded that damages were an
available remedy under the laws of the six original Member States. La Reparation des Consequences Dommageables d'une Violation des Articles 85 et 86 du Traitd Instituant la CEE,
EEC Commission (1966). As early as 1973 the Commission indicated a favorable attitude
concerning the availability and the desireability of private damage actions for violations of
Articles 85-86. See the reply to question 519/72 from Mr. Vredeling in O.J. [1973] C67/54.
See also Harding, The Use of Fines as a Sanction in EEC Competition Law, 16 COMM. MKT.
L. REV. 591, 594 (1979); Lang, Compliance with the Common Market's AntitrustLaw, 14 INT'L
LAw. 485, 490 (1980). For arguments against the availability of private damages, see BELLAMY & CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION
HALL & JAMES, EEC ANTITRUST LAW 131-136 (1975).

108 (2d ed. 1978); BAROUNOS,

157. Damages, other than multiple damages, are compensatory rather than punitive in
nature and therefore would not affect the amount of a fine imposed by the Commission. The
Commission now imposes fines based on the assumption that private damages may be available. See Lang, supra note 156, at 493.
158. Lang, Community Antitrust Law-Compliance and Enforcement, 18 COMM. MKT. L.
REV. 357 (1981). "It follows that about 90% of all cases have been dealt with by the Commission informally, with, at most, a written letter." For a discussion of informal settlements see
KERSE, supra, note 6, at 156-60. See also Sixth Report, supra note 23, at 11.
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dations for terminating an infringement to the undertaking concerned without making a formal decision.' 5 9
The Commission may also send the parties an administrative
letter, commonly referred to as a "comfort letter," which indicates
that on the basis of a preliminary examination the Commission has
decided to terminate the proceeding. A comfort letter may have
significant advantages for an undertaking because it is issued in a
relatively short period of time, and because it is not made public.
Theoretically, these administrative letters do not preclude subsequent action by the Commission, although it normally does not institute proceedings for behavior which had been the subject of such
correspondence. 6 ° In the Hasselbladcase,however, the undertakings were not allowed to rely on a comfort letter indicating that the
distribution agreements fell within the group exemption provided
in regulation 67/67. This was due to the undertaking's concerted
16
practice of restricting exports, a topic not covered by the letter. '
X.

CONCLUSION

With the decision in the Pioneercase, the Court has confirmed
the Commission's power to impose fines of up to ten percent of the
worldwide turnover of an undertaking. As illustrated in the table
of cases which follows this article, the Commission has initiated a
policy of imposing higher fines. The effect that this new policy will
have on competition within the EEC remains to be seen. However,
it is clear that companies doing business in the Community cannot
162
afford to ignore EEC competition law.

159. Article 3 of Regulation 17, supra note 8.
160. Lang, supra note 158, at 354-56; Frubo v. Commission (Case 71/74) [19751 E.C.R.
563, at 582; Perfumes cases (Cases 253/78 and 1-3/79), [1980], at point 13.
161. Hasselblad, supra note 36. For a discussion of the Commission's comfort letters see
the EEC Commission's Tenth Report on Competition Policy (1980), at points 50-52.
162. Pioneer, supra note 6.
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APPENDIX-THE FINES IMPOSED IN EEC COMPETITION CASES
INFRINGEMENT

CASE NAME

YEAR

Quinine

1969 Art. 85(l)
Price fixing,
market sharing,
ltmitatsons on
production

ACF Chjemiefarma
Boehringer
Buchler
Nogentaise
Pharmacie Centrale
Pointet-Girard

Dyestufs
A.C.N.A.
B.A.S.F.
Bayer
Ciba
Geigy
Hoechst
L.C.l.
Mainkur
Sandoz
Socit Francaise M.C.
A ?tsurgA Coning
Europe

Commercial Solvents

1969 Art. 85(l)
Uniform price
increases

Sugar

Intentional
infringement,
serious
infringement,
market share,
number and size
of participants,
market situation,
ACF favored low
prices (-)
Negligent
infringement,
frequency and
extent of
participation,
interference with
common market

1972 Art. 85(l)
Discriminatory
prices

Intentional or
negligent
infringement,
obvious
infringement,
market effect

1972 Art. 86
Refusal to supply

Negligent
infringement,
serious
infringement,
duration (-),
compliance limits
harmful effects (-)

C.S.C. and Ist C.I.

WEA-Fillpacchi

FACTORS(-)

Intentional
infringement, wellestablished
infringement, no
voluntary
termination
Intentional or at
1973 Art. 85(l)
least negligent
Market sharing,
infringement,
distribution
serious
restrictions
infringement,
duration,
Art. 86
Refusal to supply, participation,
number and size
fidelity rebates,
export and import of participants,
limited harm to
restrictions,
consumers (-),
collective
legal and
tendering
economic context,
market conditions
1972 Art. 85(l)
Export bans

A.I.E.
Beghin
Cavarzare
Centrale Suiker
Eridania
Gtnirale Sucriere
Pfeifer & Langen
S.A.D.A.M.
Socizt6 des
Raffineries
Sucres & Denrees
Suddeutsche Zucker
Sudzucker
Suiker Unie
Tirlemontoise
Volano
Zuccheri
(-) indicates a mitigatu ng factor.
*Fines stated in EUAs or ECUs.
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FINE*

RESULT ON APPEAL

Reduced to
210,000
190,000
65,000
12,500
10,000
12,500

200,000
180,000
55,000

Reduced to
40,000
50,000
50,000
50,000
50,000
50,000
50,000
50,000
50,000
50,000

30,000

100,000

No appeal

Reduced to
200,000

100,000

60,000

No appeal

Quashed/Reduced
100,000
700,000
200,000
600,000
1,000,000
400,000
800,000
100,000

Quashed
100,000
Quashed
150,000
Quashed
80,000
240,000
Quashed

500,000
1,000,000
700,000
200,000
800,000
1,500,000
100,000
300,000

80,000
100,000
Quashed
40,000
200,000
600,000
Quashed
Quashed
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CASE NAME

YEAR INFRINGEMENT

FACTORS
(-)

Deutsche Philos

1974 Art. 85(l)
Export bans

Negligent
infringement,
serious
infringement,
interference with
common market,
well- established
infringement, long
duration, product
turnover, market
share, voluntary
termination (.)

1974

Intentional
infringement,
serious
infringement,
knowingly
continuing, market
share

16 3

Papiers Peinis

Art. 85(l)
Collective boycott

Brepols
Genval
Peters-Lacroix
Vanderborght
16 4

General Motors
Continental

1974 Art. 86
Excessive charges

Intentional
infringement,
serious
infringement, short
duration (-)
immediate and
voluntary
termination (-),
reimbursement (-)

Preserved Mushrooms

1975 Art. 85(l)
Market sharing,
price fixing

Intentional
infringement,
serious
infringement,
interference with
common market,
size and number
of participants,
market share,
participation,
agreement fully
implemented,
minor effect (-)

1975 Art. 86
Restrictions on
resale, refusal to
supply,
discriminatory and
excessive prices

Negligent
infringement,
serious
infringement,
interference with
common market,
size, profits, legal
and economic
context,
consumers, total
and affected
turnover,
voluntary
compliance (-)

Blanchaud
Champex-Centre
Champifrance
Euroconserves
Faval

UniedBrands

!6 5

FINE*

6,000

RESULT ONAPPEAL
No appeal

Decision annulled
67,500
120,000
135,000
36,000
100,000

Decision annulled

No appeal

itA,5A,

Reduced to
850,000

163. Groupement des Fabricants de Papiers Peints de Belgique, [1974] O.J. L237/3,
[1974] 2 COMM. MKT. L.R. D102.
164. General Motors, [1974] O.J. L29/14, [1975] 1 COMM. MKT. L.R. D20.
165. Chiquita, [1976] O.J. L95/1, [1976] COMM. MKT. L.R. D28.
(-) indicates a mitigating factor.
*Fines stated in EUAs or ECUs.
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CASENAME

YEAR INFRNGEMENT

Vitamis

1976

Hoffman-La Roche

INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

FACTORS(-)

Art. 86
Requirements
contracts and
fidelity rebates

Intentional or at
least negligent
infringement,
serious
infringement,
duration, size and
experience,
voluntary
termination (-)

Vol. 14

RESULTON APPEAL'

Reduced to
300,000

200,000

70,000

Affirmed

Miller

1976

Art. 85(l)
Export bans

Intentional
infringement,
serious
infringement

Tepea

1976

Art. 85(l)
Export bans

Intentional
infringement,
serious
infringement,
knowingly
continuing
infringement,
interference with
common market,
minimal loss to
consumers (-)

Affirmed

1977

Art. 86
Refusal to supply

Negligent
infringement,
injury to sole
competitor

Decision
annulled

1977

Art. 85(l)
Export ban

Intentional
infringement by
BMW Belgium
and committee
members,
negligent
infringement by
dealers, legal and
factual context,
turnover,
economic
dependence of
dealers (-)

Theal
Watts

HugMi/Liotoa
Hugin AB and Hugin
Cash Registers
BMW and
Vegetable
Parchment

BM W Belghan

16 6

Advisory Committee
5 dealer-members
3 dealer-members
39 dealers

Vegetable Parchment
Dale & Lecomte
Feldmtlhle
Nicohus
Rube
Schbeipen & Erkens
Scrlachius

1977

Art. 85(1)
Market sharing
price fixing

Intentional
infringement,
serious
infringement,
participation,
market share,
turnover, minimal
harm to
consumers (-),
certainty of the
law

150,000

Affirmed

2,000 each
1,500 each
1,000 each

No appeal

166. BMW Belgium, [1978] O.J. L46/33.
(-) indicates a mitigating factor.
*Fines stated in EUAs or ECUs.
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EEC

COMPETITION

CASE NAME

YEAR

INFRINGEMENT

FACToRs (-)

Kawasaki

1978

Art. 85(l)
Export ban

Intentional
infringement,
serious
infringement,
participation
profit, injury to
consumers,
enforcement
efforts, voluntary
termination (-)

Floral

1980

Art. 85(l)
Export cartel

Negligent
infringement,
participaton, size,
total and affected
turnover, profits,
minimal effect on
users (-), voluntary
termination (-)

CFA
G.E.
S.C.C.

PioneerHi-Fi

1980

Art. 85(l)
Export bans

Melchers
Musique Diffusion
PioneerEurope
Pioneer(GB)

Johnson
& Johnson

1980 Art. 85(l)
Export bans

Ortho Pharmaceutical
Ltd., Cilag Chemic
GrnbH, Cilag Chemie AG,
and Johnson & Johnson

Michelin
NBIM

1981

Intentional
infringement,
serious and wellestablished
infringement,
participation,
injury to
consumers and
traders, legal
context,
interference with
EEC objectives,
total and affected
turnover
Intentional
infringement,
serious
infringement,
considerable
duration, size and
market share,
price difference,
enforcement, total
and affected
turnover,
principles of
equity and
proportionality

Art. 86
Negligent
Tying dealers
infringement, long
through discount duration,
policy and annual significantly
bonuses
distorted
competition,
enforcement, total
turnover, changes
made in favor of
dealers (-)

CASES

FINE*
100,000

RESULT ON APPEAL

No appeal

85,000
85,000
85,000

Reduced to
1,450,000
850,000
4,350,000
300,000

200,000

400,000
600,000
2,000,000
200,000

No appeal

Reduced to
680,000

16 7

300,000

167. Michelin v. Commission (Case 322/81), to be reported in E.C.R. and COMM. MKT.
L.R.
(-) indicates a mitigating factor.
*Fines stated in EUAs or ECUs.
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CASE NAME

INFRINGEMENT

FACTORS(-)

Moet et Chandan
(London) Ltd.

Art 85(l)
Export bans

Intentional
infringement,
serious and wellestablished
infringement, no
notification, size
and market share
Intentional
infringement,
serious
infringement, size,
injury to
consumers and
dealers, need for
deterrence

Moet-Hennessy

Htasselblad

1981

Victor Hasselblad
(Sweden)
Hasselblad GB
Ilford
Telos
Prolux
NAVEWA-ANSEAU

1981

ANSEAU and 8
other participants
9 participants
6 participants

Art. 85(1)
Partitioning the
market, resale
price maintenance

Art. 85(1)
Restriction of
parallel imports

Intentional and
negligent
participants,serious
infringement,
ANSEAU
entrusted by
public authorities
to provide service
Intentional
infringement, wellestablished
infringements,
injury to
consumers

AEG-Telefunken

1982

Art. 85(I)
Restrictive
distribution
system, dealer
discrimination,
resale price
maintenance

SSl

1982

Art. 85(l)
Price agreements

Intentional
infringement,
serious
infringement,
expressly
prohibited by Art.
85

Art. 85(l)
Export bans

Intentional
infringement,
serious
infringement,
enforcement,
adopt antitrust
compliance
program (-)

Laurens
BAT
Turmac
Reynolds
Philip Morris
Theodorus Niemeyer
NationalPanasonic

1982

LAW JOURNAL

FINE*

Vol. 14

RESULTONAPPEAL

No appeal

1,100,000

16 8

560,000
165,000
10,000
10,000
10,000

Reduced
Hasselblad GB's
fine to
80,000

69

Upheld 1

76,500 each
38,500 each
9,500 each

1,000,000

Upheld 1

70

Pending
425,000
350,000
325,000
150,000
125,000
100,000
450,000

No appeal

168. Hasselblad (GB) Ltd. v. Commission (Case 86/82R) [19821 O.J. C169/5, (Case 86/
82) [1984] 1 COMM. MKT. L.R. 559.

169. NV I.A.Z. International Belgium SA and others v. Commission ('NAVEWAAnseau') (Cases 96-102, 104, 105, 108 & 110/82) to be reported in E.C.R. and COMM. MKT.
L.R.
170. AEG-Telefunken v. Commission (Case 107/82R) [1982] O.J. C103/4 and C139/3
(Case 107/82) to be reported in E.C.R. and COMM. MKT. L.R.

(-) indicates a mitigating factor.
*Fines stated in EUAs or ECUs.
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FINES IMPOSED IN

CASE NAME

YEAR INFRINGEMENT

Zinc

1982

17 1

CRAM
RZ

EEC

Art. 85(l)
Restrict parallel
imports

5 72

1982

AROW/BNIC

Art. 85(l)
Price fixing

BNIC
3

Tol/ecs/Dorcel 17
BAT

1982

Windsurfing

1983

WSI
Ostermann
Akutec
Klepper
Shark
WSC

COMPETITION

FACTORS(-)

Intentional or at
least negligent
infringement,
serious and clear
infringement, size,
enforcement, short
duration (-)
Deliberate or at
least negligent
infringement, clear
infringement, legal
context

CASES

FINE*

RESULTON APPEAL

Pending
400,000
500,000

No appeal
160,000

Intentional
infringement, legal
advice, conduct
unlawful, first fine
with regard to
industrial property
rights (-)
Patent licensing
Art. 85(l)
agreement- grossly
Restrictions in
negligent
patent licensing
infringement,
agreements,
economic
distribution
agreements isolate importance of the
patent, no prior
national markets
fines for patent
licensing
agreements (-)
Distribution
agreementintentional
infringement,
effect on
marketing and
product supply,
limited observance
and enforcement
of restrictions (-)
Art. 85(l)
Trade mark nochallenge clause

Pending

No appeal

171. Rolled Zinc Products and Zinc Alloys, 11982] O.J. L362/40.
172. AROW/BNIC, [!982] O.J. L379/1.
173. Toltecs/Dorcet, [1982] O.J. 379/19.

(-) indicates a mitigating factor.
*Fines stated in EUAs or ECUs.
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CASE NAME

YEAR

INFRINGEMENT

FACTORS(-)

Cast Iron
andSteel Rolls

1983

Art. 85(l)
Price
collaboration,
market sharing

Deliberate
infringement,
duration (12
years), interference
with common
market, extensive
industry
involvement,
economic
importance of the
industry and the
infringement,
undertaking's
participation and
relative
importance of the
product,
(-) persistent losses
and grave
financial situation,
(-) financial strain
of restructuring
the steel industry

An. 85(l)
Restrict parallel
imports
(NAVEWAANSEAU
agreement)

Deliberate
infringement,
aware of the
anticompetitive
intent, leading part
indrafting and
implementing the
agreement,
duration, relevant
circumstances and
market position,
drastically reduced
scale of overall
business (-)

Griffin
Fonderies Marichal
SAFAK
Achenbach Buschhutten
Eduard Breitenbach
Leonard Breitenbach
Karl Buch WalzengieBerei
Gontermann-Peipers
Walzen Irle
Fried. Krupp
WalzengieBerei Roland
Thyssen GieBerei
CSFCF
Soc. Chavanne-Delattre
Soc. F.C. Laminoirs
SARL
Usinor
Innocenti Santeustacchio
Fonderie Sant Agostino
Fonderia San Gregorio
Fonderie San Zeno
Davy Roll
Midland Rollmakers
R.B. Tennent
Eisenwerk Sulzau-Werfen
Bofors Akers
IPTC Belgium

1983

LAW JOURNAL

FINE*

Vol. 14

RESULTON APPEAL

No appeal

45,000
80,000
75,000
27,000
16,000
17,000
65,000
26,000
72,000
9,000
21,000
42,000
29,000
65,000
111,000
25,500
36,500
111,000
14,000
10,000
8,000
85,000
63,000
26,000
71,000
100,000
5,000

No appeal

(-) indicates a mitigating factor.
*Fines stated in EUAs or ECUs.
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